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A natural way to represent beliefs and the process of updating beliefs is presented by Bayesian
probability theory, where belief of an agent a in P can be interpreted as a considering that P is more
probable than not P. This paper attempts to get at the core logical notion underlying this.
The paper presents a sound and complete neighbourhood logic for conditional belief and knowl-
edge, and traces the connections with probabilistic logics of belief and knowledge. The key notion
in this paper is that of an agent a believing P conditionally on having information Q, where it is
assumed that Q is compatible with what a knows.
Conditional neighbourhood logic can be viewed as a core system for reasoning about subjective
plausibility that is not yet committed to an interpretation in terms of numerical probability. Indeed,
everyweightedKripkemodel gives rise to a conditional neighbourhoodmodel, but not vice versa. We
show that our calculus for conditional neighbourhood logic is sound but not complete for weighted
Kripke models. Next, we show how to extend the calculus to get completeness for the class of
weighted Kripke models.
Neighbourhood models for conditional belief are closed under model restriction (public an-
nouncement update), while earlier neighbourhoodmodels for belief as ‘willingness to bet’ were not.
Therefore the logic we present improves on earlier neighbourhood logics for belief and knowledge.
We present complete calculi for public announcement and for publicly revealing the truth value of
propositions using reduction axioms. The reductions show that adding these announcement operators
to the language does not increase expressive power.
1 Introduction
This paper aims at isolating a core logic of rational belief and belief update that is compatible with the
Bayesian picture of rational inference [11], but that is more general, in the sense that it does not force
epistemic weight models (that is, models with fixed subjective probability measures, for each agent) on
us.
Epistemic neighbourhood models, as defined in [7], represent belief as truth in a neighbourhood,
where the neighbourhoods for an agent are subsets of the current knowledge cell of that agent. Intuitively,
a neighbourhood lists those propositions compatible with what the agent knows that the agent considers
as more likely than their complements. Since we intend to use neighbourhood semantics to model a
certain kind of belief, it is natural to study belief updates. However, there is an annoying obstacle for
updates even in a very simple case: public announcement.
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year 2016/2017. We wish to thank Dick de Jongh for useful advice, and Malvin Gattinger for his help and advice when we
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Intuitively, a public announcement would make an agent restrict his/her belief to the announced
case. A natural way to implement this is by restricting every belief-neighbourhood to φ -worlds after
announcing φ . The following example shows that this does not work, because this kind of update does
not preserve reasonable neighbourhood conditions. Suppose Alice, somewhat irrationally, believes that
ticket t she has bought is the winning ticket in a lottery that she knows has 10,000 tickets. Let n represent
the world where ticket n is winning (we assume that this is a single winner lottery, and that Alice knows
this). Then Alice’s belief is given by a neighbourhood model with
Na(n) = {X ⊆ {0000, . . . ,9999} | t ∈ X},
for all n ∈ {0000, . . . ,9999}. Note that Alice’s belief does not depend on the world she is in: if n,m are
different worlds, then Na(n) = Na(m).
Assume Alice gets the information that some ticket v different from the ticket t that she bought is the
winning ticket. Let p be such that V (p) = {v}. Then updating with p leads to an updated model with
world set {v}, and with N ′a(v) = {X ∩{v} | X ∈ Na(v)} = { /0,{v}}. However, N
′
a(v) is not a neighbour-
hood function, for it contradicts the condition that beliefs should be consistent (different from /0).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces conditional neighbourhood se-
mantics as an enrichment of epistemic neighbourhood semantics, and presents a complete calculus for it.
In Section 3 we show that this calculus is sound but not complete for epistemic weight models, and next,
that our language is expressive enough to allow an extension to a complete system for weight models.
Section 4 shows that conditional neighborhood models are an excellent starting point for an extension
with public announcement update operators. Section 5 traces connections with the literature, lists further
work, and concludes.
2 Conditional Neighbourhood Semantics
Epistemic neighbourhood models are defined in [7] as epistemic models M = (W,∼,V ) with a neigh-
bourhood function N added to them. The neighbourhood function assigns to each agent a and each world
w ∈W a neighbourhood Na(w) that consists of the set of propositions that agent a believes in w.
Intuitively each element in neighbourhood Na(w) represents a belief agent a holds. Usually belief
is bolder than knowledge. Indeed, most people believe many things of which they are not sure. If we
equate certainty with knowledge, then this means that any belief of agent a should be a subset of agent
a’s current knowledge cell, i.e., the set [w]a = {u ∈W | w ∼a u}. It follows that each proposition in
neighbourhood Na(w) is a subset of [w]a. Thus it is natural (in the framework of epistemic modal logic)
to assume the following neighbourhood conditions:
Monotonicity If an agent believes X , and knows that X entails Y , then the agent believes Y .
No-inconsistency An agent does not hold an inconsistent belief.
Determinacy An agent do not believe both a proposition and its complement.
However as is illustrated by Alice’s Lottery example from the introductory section, public announce-
ment update do not preserve the No-inconsistency condition. In order to overcome this problem, we
propose to enrich neighbourhood functions N with an extra parameter for propositions. In other words,
instead of focusing on what agents believe, we turn our attention to what agents would believe under
some assumption. Following this intuition, for each proposition X , Nwa (X) is a set of propositions such
that each of these propositions represents a belief agent a holds at state w when supposing X . In this
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paper, we are interested in beliefs as ‘willingness to bet’, i.e., an agent believes a proposition Y suppos-
ing X if the agent considers Y ∩X more likely to be true than its complement conditioned by X , namely
−Y ∩X . We also assume the following postulate:
Equivalence of Conditions If an agent knows that two conditions are equivalent, then the agent’s beliefs
are the same under both conditions.
For non-equivalent conditions, on the other hand, conditional beliefs may vary.
Assume p ranges over a set of proposition letters P, and a over a finite set of agents A. The language
for conditional neighbourhood logic LCN is given by the following BNF definition:
φ ::=⊤ | p | ¬φ | (φ ∧φ) | Ba(φ ,φ)
Ba(φ ,ψ) can be read as “assuming φ , agent a believes (is willing to bet) ψ”. ⊥,∨,→,↔ are defined
as usual. Somewhat arbitrarily, we assume that conditioning with information that contradicts what the
agent knows (is certain of) will cause an agent to believe nothing anymore. This means we can define
knowledge in terms of conditional belief, as follows. Use Kaφ for ¬Ba(¬φ ,⊤) (which can be read as
“¬φ contradicts what agent a is certain of”,) and Kˇaφ for ¬Ka¬φ .
Consider Alice’s lottery situation again. Alice knows there are 10,000 lottery tickets numbered 0000
through 9999. Alice believes ticket t is winning (and buys it). Let n represent the world where ticket n is
winning. Then Alice’s belief is given by a conditional neighbourhood model with Nwa (X) = {Y ⊆ X | t ∈
Y} if t ∈ X , and Nwa (X) = {Y ⊆ X | |Y |>
1
2
|X |} if t /∈ X . Now Alice receives the information that v 6= t
is the winning ticket. Then v = w, the updated model has universe {v}, and Alice updates her belief to
N ′ with N ′
v
a({v}) = {{v}}. In the updated model, Alice knows that v is the winning ticket.
Definition 1. Let Ag be a finite set of agents. A conditional neighbourhood modelM is a tuple (W,N,V )
where:
• W is a non-empty set of worlds;
• N : Ag×W ×PW →PPW is a function that assigns to every agent a ∈ Ag, every world w ∈W
and set of worlds X ⊆W a collection Nwa (X) of sets of worlds–each such set called a neighbourhood
of X–subject to the following conditions, where
[w]a = {v ∈W | ∀X ⊆W,N
w
a (X) = N
v
a(X)} :
(c) ∀Y ∈ Nwa (X) : Y ⊆ X ∩ [w]a.
(ec) ∀Y ⊆W : if X ∩ [w]a = Y ∩ [w]a, then N
w
a (X) = N
w
a (Y ).
(d) ∀Y ∈ Nwa (X),X ∩ [w]a−Y /∈ N
w
a (X).
(sc) ∀Y,Z ⊆ X ∩ [w]a : if X ∩ [w]a−Y /∈ N
w
a (X) and Y ( Z, then Z ∈ N
w
a (X).
• V is a valuation.
We call N a neighbourhood function; a neighbourhood Nwa (X) for agent a in w, conditioned by X is
a set of propositions each of which agent a believes more likely to be true than its complement.
Property (c) expresses that what is believed is also known; (ec) expresses equivalence of conditions;
(d) expresses determinacy; (sc) expresses a form of “strong commitment”: if the agent does not believe
the complement of Y then she must believe any weaker Z implied by Y . It can be proved (see Appendix
A, Lemma 11) that these conditions together imply that any conditional neighbourhood model M =
(W,N,V ) also satisfies the following, for any a ∈ A, w ∈W , X ⊆W :
(m) ∀Y ⊆ Z ⊆ X ∩ [w]a : if Y ∈ N
w
a (X), then Z ∈ N
w
a (X);
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(ni) /0 /∈ Nwa (X);
(n)* if X ∩ [w]a 6= /0, then X ∩ [w]a ∈ N
w
a (X);
( /0) if X ∩ [w]a = /0, then N
w
a (X) = /0;
where (m) and (ni) expresses monotonicity and no-inconsistency respectively. ( /0) expresses that con-
ditioning with information that contradicts what the agent knows will cause an agent to believe nothing
anymore. Note that ( /0) reflects our definition for K-operators Kaφ ::= ¬Ba(¬φ ,⊤).
Let M = (W,N,V ) be a conditional neighbourhood model, let w ∈W . Then the key clause of the
truth definition is given by:
M,w  Ba(φ ,ψ) iff for some Y ∈ N
w
a (JφKM), Y ⊆ JψKM
where JφK
M
= {w ∈W |M,w  φ}. Because of (m), we can prove that
M,w  Ba(φ ,ψ) iff {v ∈ JφKM∩ [w]a |M,v  ψ} ∈ N
w
a (JφKM).
It is worth noting that by (ni), Ba(φ ,⊥) will always be invalid for any agent a and any formula φ .
Note that conditional neighborhood models do not have epistemic relations ∼a. However, such
relations can be introduced by the neighourhood function as follows: for each a ∈ Ag, ∼a ⊆W ×W is a
relation such that
∀w,v ∈W,w ∼a v iff ∀X ⊆W, N
w
a (X) = N
v
a(X).
Then M,w  Kaφ iff for each v∼a w,M,v  φ .
It can be proved that the version of conditional neighbourhood models with epistemic relations ∼a is
equivalent to the version without (see Appendix A). Such equivalence is guaranteed by properties (n)*,
( /0) and another property which was can be found in [1](, however they use neighbourhoods instead of
conditional neighbourhoods for beliefs):
(a) ∀v ∈ [w]a : N
w
a (X) = N
v
a(X),
which states that if a agent cannot distinguish two worlds, then the agent holds the same beliefs on either
of these two worlds. Thus we do not differentiate conditional neighbourhood models with or without
such relations.
In Figure 1, axiom (D) guarantees the truth of neighbourhood condition (d), (EC) would correspond
to (ec), (M) to (ec), (M) to (m), (C) to (c) and (SC) to (sc).
Theorem 2. The CN calculus for Conditional Neighbourhood logic given in Figure 1 is sound and
complete for conditional neighbourhood models.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Note that the calculus does not have 4 and 5 for K; this is because these principles are derivable from
(5B) and (4B).
For an example of an interesting principle that can already be proved in the CN calculus, consider
the following. Suppose we have a biased coin with unknown bias, and we want to use it to simulate a
fair coin. Then we can use a recipe first proposed by John von Neumann [13]: toss the coin twice. If the
two outcomes are not the same, use the first result; if not, forget the outcomes and repeat the procedure.
Why does this work? Because we can assume that two tosses of the same coin have the same likelihood
of showing heads, even if the coin is biased. We can express subjective likelihood comparison in our
language. See Figure 2, where we use α for “the first toss comes up with heads”, and β for “the second
toss comes up with heads”. This hinges on the following principle:
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(Taut) All instances of propositional tautologies
(Dist-K) Ka(φ → ψ)→ Kaφ → Kaψ
(T) Kaφ → φ
(5B) Ba(φ ,ψ)→ KaBa(φ ,ψ)
(4B) ¬Ba(φ ,ψ)→ Ka¬Ba(φ ,ψ)
(D) Ba(φ ,ψ)→¬Ba(φ ,¬ψ)
(EC) Ka(φ ↔ ψ)→ Ba(φ ,χ)→ Ba(ψ ,χ)
(M) Ka(φ → ψ)→ Ba(χ ,φ)→ Ba(χ ,ψ)
(C) Ba(φ ,ψ)→ Ba(φ ,φ ∧ψ)
(SC) Bˇaφ ∧ Kˇa(¬φ ∧ψ)→ Ba(φ ∨ψ)
Rules:
φ → ψ φ
ψ
(MP)
φ
Kaφ
(Nec-K)
Figure 1: The CN Calculus for Conditional Neighbourhood Logic
If α and β have the same likelihood, then α ∧¬β and ¬α ∧ β should also have the same
likelihood, and vice versa.
Notice that Ba(α ↔ ¬β ,α) expresses that agent a considers α ∧¬β more likely than ¬α ∧ β . And it
follows from the comparison principle in Figure 2 that this is equivalent to: a considers α more likely
than β . From now on, let α ≻a β abbreviate Ba(α ↔¬β ,α).
By axioms M and C, Ba(α ↔ ¬β ,β )↔ Ba(α ↔ ¬β ,¬α), and by axiom D, Ba(α ↔ ¬β ,α)→
¬Ba(α ↔ ¬β ,¬α). Therefore, Ba(α ↔ ¬β ,α)→ ¬Ba(α ↔ ¬β ,β ) is provable in the CN calculus.
Using the abbreviation: α ≻a β →¬β ≻a α . We therefore have three mutually exclusive cases:
• α ≻a β .
• β ≻a α .
• ¬α ≻a β ∧¬β ≻a α .
Agreeing to abbreviate the third case as α ≈a β , we get the following totality principle.
Totality (α ≻a β )∨ (β ≻a α)∨ (α ≈a β ).
Next, we define α <a β by ¬β ≻a α . This abbreviation gives:
Refl Totality (α <a β )∨ (β <a α).
We can also connect to logic languages concerning probability that do not have knowledge operators Ka
but instead use <a⊤ (for instance [9] and [10]), by deriving that (α <a ⊤)↔ Kaα .
3 Incompleteness and Completeness for Epistemic Weight Models
In this Section we interpret LCN in epistemic weight models, and give an incompleteness and a com-
pleteness result.
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α β
α ∧βα ∧¬β β ∧¬α
Figure 2: Comparison principle: α ∧¬β ≻ β ∧¬α iff α ≻ β
Definition 3. An Epistemic Weight Model for agents Ag and basic propositions P is a tuple M =
(W,R,L,V ) whereW is a non-empty countable set of worlds, R assigns to every agent a ∈ Ag an equiv-
alence relation ∼a onW , L assigns to every a ∈ Ag a function La fromW to Q
+ (the positive rationals),
subject to the following boundedness condition (*).
∀a ∈ Ag ∀w ∈W ∑
u∈[w]a
La(u)< ∞.
where [w]a is the cell of w in the partition induced by ∼a. V assigns to every w ∈W a subset of P.
We can interpret conditional belief sentences in these models. Let M be a weight model, and let
JφK
M
= {w ∈W |M,w  φ}. Let w be a world ofM. Then
M,w  Ba(φ ,ψ) iff La([w]a∩ Jφ ∧ψKM)> La([w]a∩ Jφ ∧¬ψKM),
and M,w  Kaφ iff for all v ∈ [w]a, M,w  φ . One easily checks that the axioms of the CN calculus are
true for this interpretation, so we have:
Theorem 4. The CN calculus is sound for epistemic weight models.
To see that we do not have completeness, observe that we can express Savage’s Sure Thing Principle
in our language. In Savage’s example this is about action. If an agent would do a thing if he would know
φ , and would do the same thing if he would know ¬φ , then he should do the thing in any case:
A businessman contemplates buying a certain piece of property. He considers the outcome of the
next presidential election relevant. So, to clarify the matter to himself, he asks whether he would buy
if he knew that the Democratic candidate were going to win, and decides that he would. Similarly,
he considers whether he would buy if he knew that the Republican candidate were going to win,
and again finds that he would. Seeing that he would buy in either event, he decides that he should
buy, even though he does not know which event obtains, or will obtain, as we would ordinarily say.
Savage, [14, p 21].
The following formula expresses this Sure Thing Principle, not about action but about belief:
Ba(φ ,ψ)∧Ba(¬φ ,ψ)→ Ba(⊤,ψ).
It is not hard to see that this principle is valid for weight models: if ψ has greater weight than ¬ψ within
the φ area, and also within the ¬φ area, then it is a matter of adding these weights to see that ψ has greater
weight than ¬ψ in the whole domain. But the Sure Thing Principle is not a validity for neighbourhood
models. Let us consider the following urn example modified from Ellsberg’s paradox [8].
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Example 5. An urn contains 120 balls: 30 red balls, 30 green balls, and 60 yellow or blue balls (in some
unknown proportion). A ball x will be pulled out of this urn, and there are 3 pairs of gambles where Alice
has to pick her choice:
Gr : x is red Gy : x is yellow
Gg : x is green Gb : x is blue
Grg : x is either red or green Gyb : x is either yellow or blue
Alice knows that the likelihood of Grg (1/2) is the same as Gyb (1/2), but is uncertain of the likelihood of
Gy and Gb. Alice is ambiguity averse in her beliefs, which means that she is willing to bet Gr against Gy,
and Gg against Gb.
To model this example, letW = {red,green,yellow,blue}, and let the neighbourhood function be the
same for any w ∈W , with
Nw({red,yellow}) = {{red},{red,yellow}},
Nw({green,blue}) = {{green},{green,blue}},
Nw(W ) contains all subsets with at least 3 worlds. The reason that such model exists is that all our
neighbourhood properties do not express anything about connections between different neighbourhoods.
Thus, in this model we have B(Gr∨Gy,Gr), B(Gg∨Gb,Gg) and B(⊤,¬(Gr∨Gg)) all true in every world,
in contradiction with the Sure Thing principle.
Theorem 6. The CN calculus is incomplete for epistemic weight models.
Proof. As we have seen, B(Gr∨Gy,Gr∨Gg)∧B(Gg∨Gb,Gr∨Gg)→B(⊤,Gr∨Gg) is false in the above
neighbourhood counterexample to Sure Thing. So by Theorem 2, Sure Thing cannot be proved in the
CN calculus. But Sure Thing is valid in the class of epistemic weighted models.
A Complete Calculus for Epistemic Weight Models
[16] and [9] proposed a complete logic QP for epistemic weight models based on a language LQP given
by the following BNF definition1:
φ ::=⊤ | p | ¬φ | (φ ∧φ) | φ <a φ
≻a and ≈a are given as usual. <a⊤ functions as Ka in epistemic modal logic. The complex formula
α0 . . .αmEaβ0 . . .βm first proposed by Segerberg in [16] is an abbreviation of the formula expressing that
for all worlds w in the evaluated knowledge cell of agent a, the number of αi among α0 . . .αm true in
w is the same as those of β j among β0 . . .βm true in w. QP logic does not assume that every world in
an agent’s knowledge cell has the same likelihood for all propositions; and is with the following core
axioms:
(A4) α0α1 . . .αmEaβ0β1 . . .βm∧ (α0 <a β0)∧ . . .∧ (αm−1 <a βm−1)→ (βm <a αm) for all m≥ 1.
Nevertheless, not only we can express every notion in the probabilistic language LQP, but using the
results of [9] and [15] we can prove the following completeness theorem as well (the proof is a simple
adaptation of a proof found in [9], just to observe that every other axioms in [9] except (A4) is provable
in CN calculus).
Theorem 7. CN⊕(A4) is complete for epistemic weight models.
1We replaced “0” and “1” in [9] with the equivalent notation “⊥” and “⊤” respectively, and extend this language to multia-
gent case.
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Comparing Expressive Power
In this subsection we compare the expressive power between LCN and LQP, restricting our attention to
the single-agent case. As is shown in Section 2, we can translate LCN into LQP by defining Tr1 :LCN →
LQP with key case:
Tr1(B(α ,β )) = Tr1(α ∧β )≻ Tr1(α ∧¬β )),
which express that the agent considers α ∧ β is more likely than α ∧¬β . Likewise we can define the
translation Tr2 from LQP to LCN by key case
Tr2(α < β ) = ¬B(Tr2(α ↔¬β ),Tr2(β )).
It is easy to prove that both translations preserve truth on weight models. As for conditional neighbour-
hood models, consider the following truth definition for LQP:
M,w qp α < β iff J¬α ∧β K
qp
M
/∈ Nw(Jα ↔¬β Kqp
M
),
which is equivalent to( by condition (d) and α ≻ β ::=¬β < α),
M,w qp α ≻ β iff Jα ∧¬β K
qp
M
∈ Nw(Jα ↔¬β Kqp
M
).
Such truth condition parallels with our translation Tr2. Furthermore, to show that Tr1 preserves
truth value on conditional neighbourhood models, we can prove by induction on construction of LCN-
formulas, and establish the following equivalences:
M,w qp Tr1(B(α ,β )) iff M,w qp α
′∧β ′ ≻ α ′∧¬β ′
iff J(α ′∧β ′)∧¬(α ′∧¬β ′)Kqp
M
∈ Nw(J(α ′∧β ′)↔¬(α ′∧¬β ′)Kqp
M
)
iff Jα ′∧β ′Kqp
M
∈ Nw(Jα ′Kqp
M
)
iff Jβ ′Kqp
M
∈ Nw(Jα ′Kqp
M
) (by condition (n)*)
iff Jβ K
M
∈ Nw(JαK
M
) (by induction hypothesis)
iff M,w  B(α ,β ),
where α ′ = Tr1(α) and β
′ = Tr1(β ). Therefore we can prove that both Tr1 and Tr2 preserve truth value
on conditional neighbourhood models.
However we can design models violating the comparison principle of Figure 2. LQP can differentiate
models where the principle holds from those where it does not, while LCN cannot. A comparison model
N is a triple (W,,V ) where W is a non-empty set of worlds,  ⊆ PW ×PW is a relation between
propositions, and V is a valuation. Truth definition for LQP is with the following key clause:
N,w 2 α < β iff JαKN  Jβ KN .
Furthermore the key clause in the truth condition for LCN is given by:
N,w 1 B(α ,β ) iff Jα ∧β KN  Jα ∧¬β KN ,
which parallels with translation Tr1 at the semantic level.
Let N1 = (W,1,V ) and N2 = (W,2,V ) be comparison models such that:
1. W = {{p,q},{p},{q}, /0}
2. 1 = {({{p},{p,q}},{{q},{p,q}}),({p},{q})},
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3. 2 = {({p},{q})},
4. w ∈V (r) iff r ∈ w.
The only difference betweenN1 andN2 is that JpKN1 1 JqKN1 but not JpKN2 2 JqKN2 . Thus N2 violates
the comparison principle, and ¬(p< q)∧ (p∧¬q< ¬p∧q) is valid onN2 but not onN1. However we
can prove that N1 and N2 satisfy the same set of LCN -formulas. The crucial fact is to observe that we
only use the comparison relation for disjoint propositions for 1. For instance B(p↔¬q, p) = Tr2(p<
q) = Tr2(p∧¬q< p∧¬q) is valid on both N1 and N2, because for each i ∈ {1,2},
Ni,w 1 B(p↔¬q, p)) iff J(p↔¬q)∧ pKNi i
J(p↔¬q)∧¬pK
Ni
iff Jp∧¬qK
Ni
i J¬p∧qKNi
iff {p} i {q}, which holds for
either i ∈ {1,2}.
Therefore LQP is more expressive than LCN . We conclude LCN as a core logic for conditional belief as
willingness to bet.
4 Public Announcement for Conditional Neighborhood Models
Public announcement update for weight models parallels Bayesian update in probability theory. Public
announcement update for probabilistic logic was first treated in [12], and more complicated probabilis-
tic updates were discussed in [2] and [5]. As was mentioned in the introduction, public announcement
updates may destroy reasonable neighbourhood conditions. The good news is that conditional neigh-
bourhood models are more well behaved. We propose two ways of public announcement updating:
deleting points and cutting links; and show reduction axioms for either of them. These shows that our
neighbourhood conditions are some core principles that preserved by Bayesian update.
4.1 Deleting Points
The first approach is the usual one for public announcement update, which is restricting the domain to
φ -worlds after announcing φ . It assumes that only facts (true propositions at the current world) can be
publicly announced. Public announcements create common knowledge, but it need not be the case that a
fact that gets announced becomes true after the update; Moore sentences are a well-known exception.
The language LPC is the result of extending our base language LCN with a public announcement
operator:
φ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬φ | (φ ∧φ) | Ba(φ ,φ) | [φ ]φ
If M = (W,N,V ) is a conditional neighborhood model, ∼ is the induced epistemic relation, and φ is a
formula of the LPC language, then M
φ = (W φ ,φN,V φ ) is given by:
• W φ = {w ∈W |M,w  φ}
• w∼
φ
a u iffM,w  φ , M,u  φ and w∼a u
• φNwa (X) =
{
Nwa (X) if X ⊆W
φ and w ∈W φ
undefined otherwise
• V φ (p) =V (p)∩W φ
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Example 8. As an example, consider Alice’s lottery situation again. Alice knows there are 10,000 lottery
tickets numbered 0000 through 9999. Alice believes ticket t is winning (and buys it). Let n represent the
world where ticket n is winning. Then Alice’s belief is given by a conditional neighborhood model with
Nwa (X) = {Y ⊆ X | t ∈ Y} if t ∈ X, and N
w
a (X) = {Y ⊆ X | |Y | >
1
2
|X |} if t /∈ X. Now Alice receives
the information that v 6= t is the winning ticket. Then v = w, the updated model has universe {v}, and
Alice updates her belief to N ′ with N ′
v
a({v}) = {{v}}. The updated model satisfies the conditions for a
conditional neighborhood model.
Definition 9. Semantics for PC: let M= (W,N,V ) be a conditional neighborhood model, let w ∈W .
M,w PC [φ ]ψ iffM,w PC φ implies M
φ ,w PC ψ .
A complete calculus for PC consists of the calculus for CN, plus the usual Reduction Axioms of
public announcement update for boolean cases and the following key Reduction Axiom (call this system
PC):
• [φ ]Ba(ψ ,χ)↔ (φ → Ba(φ ∧ [φ ]ψ , [φ ]χ))
In Appendix C we prove that the PC Calculus is sound and complete w.r.t. PC.
4.2 Cutting Links
We can generalize public announcement of facts to public announcement of truth values. In announcing
the value of φ , it depends on the truth value of φ in the actual world whether φ or ¬φ gets announced.
The language LPC± for this kind of update is given by the following BNF:
φ ::=⊤ | p | ¬φ | (φ ∧φ) | Ba(φ ,φ) | [±φ ]φ
To capture the intuition of such updates for conditional neighbourhoods, we use the following mechanism
that cuts epistemic relations between φ -worlds and ¬φ -worlds after announcing φ .
IfM= (W,N,V ) is a conditional neighborhood model, ∼ is the induced epistemic relation, and φ is
a formula of the LPC± language, then M
±φ = (W±φ ,±φN,V±φ ) is given by:
• W±φ =W
• ∼±φ= {(w,v) ∈W 2 | w∼a v and M,w  φ iff M,v  φ}
• ±φNwa (X) = N
w
a (X ∩ [w]
±φ
a )
• V±φ =V
Definition 10. Semantics for PC±: letM= (W,N,V ) be a conditional neighborhood model, let w ∈W .
M,w ⊢PC± [φ ]ψ iffM
±φ ,w ⊢PC± ψ .
The system PC± for ⊢PC± consists of the calculus for CN, plus the following Reduction Axioms:
• [±φ ]p↔ p
• [±φ ]¬ψ ↔¬[±φ ]ψ
• [±φ ](ψ ∧ χ)↔ [±φ ]ψ ∧ [±φ ]χ
• [±φ ]Ba(ψ ,χ)↔ (φ → Ba(φ ∧ [±φ ]ψ , [±φ ]χ))∧ (¬φ → Ba(¬φ ∧ [±φ ]ψ , [±φ ]χ))
Also in Appendix C we prove that the PC± Calculus is sound and complete w.r.t. PC±.
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5 Conclusions and Future Work
In Section 1, we illustrated that public announcement update may not preserve reasonable neighbourhood
conditions. To overcome this problem, we introduced conditional neighourhood semantics in Section 2.
We gave an alternative interpretation for this system in Section 3, and then in Section 4 we gave two
flavours of public announcement update for conditional neighborhood semantics. Because public an-
nouncement update for epistemic weight models is basically Bayesian update in a logical setting, and
because the complete calculus CN for conditional neighourhood models is a subsystem of a complete
probabilistic logic CN⊕(A4) (as shown in Section 3), our investigations show that CN can be viewed
as a core logic of rational belief and belief update that is compatible with the Bayesian picture of infer-
ence, but more general. Conditional neighborhood models generalize epistemic weight models, and this
generalization creates room for modelling ambiguity aversion in belief as willingness to bet.
In Section 3 we have shown that LCN has weaker expressive power than LQP. Our conditional
neighourhood semantics for LCN allows us to develop a reasoning system CN that is not yet committed
to a probabilistic numerical interpretation of belief. This might be a convenient starting point for further
investigation of counterfactual reasoning. In Section 2 we have assumed that conditioning with infor-
mation that contradicts an agent’s knowledge will cause the agent to refrain believing anything, but in
future work we may relax this constraint, by allowing to visit knowledge cells other than the current one
when a neighbourhood function is conditioned with propositions that conflict with current knowledge. A
naive way to do so is to incorporate the selection function f for counterfactuals proposed by Stalnaker in
[17] in our framework. When a proposition X is disjoint with agent a’s current knowledge cell [w]a, the
selection function f would guide us to an X -world u= fa(X ,w), and then let the neighbourhood N
w
a (X)
be Nua (X), which is the neighourhood conditioned by X at [u]a.
While subjective conditional beliefs given by neighbourhood functions suggest how agents’ beliefs
would change by public announcements, further updates like public lies and recovery from lies may allow
us to represent further details of agents’ beliefs in an objective way. Here, recovery is to free agents from
the influence of lies that were accepted as true in the past. These two kinds of updates give us powerful
tools to test what a agent would believe after providing each possible piece of information, which in turn
would inform us the agent’s conditional beliefs or subjective probability. It is future work to compare and
combine these two approaches: subjective conditional beliefs informative for belief update and objective
belief changes to conditional beliefs.
Neighourhood structures have also been used to describe the pieces of evidence that agents accept
([6],[3],[4]). In this approach, each proposition in a neighbourhood is interpreted as a piece of evidence,
instead of a belief; and because evidences are usually acquired in various situations, such evidence
neighbourhoods may have contradictory propositions. Furthermore, beliefs are generated from certain
consistent subsets of the evidence neighbourhood. Even though evidence models and conditional neigh-
bourhood models provide different perspectives on belief, we may be able to combine them in future.
In one direction, conditional beliefs or even subjective probability could be generated from certain ev-
idence models, while the way evidence is involved in belief formation may provide information about
the strengths of the resulting beliefs. In the other direction, our conditional beliefs might serve as prior
knowledge for specifying the credence of evidence.
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A Alternative Definition of Conditional Neighborhood Models
Lemma 11. Let M = (W,N,V ) be a conditional neighborhood model. Then M satisfies the following
conditions for any a ∈ Ag, x ∈W and X ⊆W:
(m) ∀Y ⊆ Z ⊆ X ∩ [w]a : if Y ∈ N
w
a (X), then Z ∈ N
w
a (X);
(no-emptyset) /0 /∈ Nwa (X);
(n)* if X ∩ [w]a 6= /0, then X ∩ [w]a ∈ N
w
a (X);
( /0) if X ∩ [w]a = /0, then N
w
a (X) = /0.
Proof. Let a ∈ Ag, x ∈W , X ⊆W and X ′ = X ∩ [w]a.
First consider (m). Let Y ⊆ Z ⊆ X ′ and Y ∈ Nwa (X). Suppose for contradiction Z /∈ N
w
a (X). Then
Y 6= Z, and hence Y ( Z, which implies X ′− Z ( X ′−Y . It follows, from (sc), that X ′−Y ∈ Nwa (X),
contrary to Y ∈ Nwa (X) and (d).
Second consider (no-emptyset). Suppose for contradiction that /0 ∈ Nwa (X). If X
′ = /0, then by (c)
Nwa (X) = { /0}; but by (d), since /0 ∈ N
w
a (X),
/0= X ′− /0 /∈ Nwa (X).
Contradiction! If X ′ 6= /0, then since /0⊆ X ′, by (m) we have X ′ ∈ Nwa (X); but because /0 ∈ N
w
a (X), by (d)
X ′ = X ′− /0 should not in Nwa (X), contradiction.
Third for (n)*. Suppose X ′ 6= /0 and for contradiction that X ′ /∈ Nwa (X). Then X
′− /0 /∈ Nwa (X), and by
(sc)
/0( X ′ ∈ Nwa (X),
a contradiction!
Last for ( /0). Suppose X ′ = /0. Then by (c), for all Y ∈ Nwa (X), Y = /0. Because of (no-emptyset), we
have /0 /∈ NXa (w). Therefore N
w
a (X) = /0.
Note that in Definition 1 the equivalence relation for knowledge is derived from the conditional
neighborhood function. Here we will show that there is an equivalent definition that takes epistemic
equivalences as primary.
Definition 12. Let Ag be a finite set of agents. A conditional neighborhood model* M is a tuple
(W,∼,N,V ) where:
• W is a non-empty set of worlds;
• ∼ assigns to each a ∈ Ag an equivalence relation ∼a onW , and we use [w]a for the ∼a class of w;
• N assigns to each a ∈ Ag a function Na that assigns to every world w ∈W and set of worlds X ⊆W
a collection Nwa (X) of sets of worlds–each such set called a neighborhood of X–subject to the
following conditions:
(c) ∀Y ∈ Nwa (X) : Y ⊆ X ∩ [w]a;
(a) ∀v ∈ [w]a : N
w
a (X) = N
v
a(X);
(d) ∀Y ∈ Nwa (X), X ∩ [w]a−Y /∈ N
w
a (X);
(sc) ∀Y,Z ⊆ X ∩ [w]a : if X −Y /∈ N
w
a (X) and Y ( Z, then Z ∈ N
w
a (X);
(ec) ∀Y ⊆W : if X ∩ [w]a =Y ∩ [w]a, then N
w
a (X) = N
w
a (Y );
• V is a valuation.
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Note that in this definition we have another condition (a) on neighborhood functions. This contrasts
with Definition 1, where we already make sure that (a) holds by the way we define [w]a.
In Definition 12, however, [w]a is defined in terms of ∼a, which is simply an equivalence relation
that does not come with a guarantee for (a).
The following proposition assures us that the two approaches are equivalent.
Proposition 13. Let M = (W,∼,N,V ) be a conditional neighborhood model*, let a ∈ Ag and let Ra ⊆
W ×W be defined as follows:
• ∀w,v ∈W,wRav iff ∀X ⊆W, N
w
a (X) = N
v
a(X).
Then ∼a= Ra, and (W,N,V ) is a conditional neighborhood model.
Proof. Let w,v ∈W . Suppose w ∼a v. Then by (a), we know that for each X ⊆W , N
w
a (X) = N
v
a(X),
which implies (w,v) ∈ Ra.
Suppose it is not the case that w ∼a v. Then [w]a∩ [v]a = /0. Similar to the proofs in Lemma 11, we
can prove (n)* and ( /0) forM, and hence we have [w]a ∈N
w
a ([w]a), and by ( /0), [w]a /∈ N
v
a([w]a). It follows
that Nwa ([w]a) 6= N
v
a([w]a), which implies (w,v) /∈ Ra.
Therefore [w]a = {v ∈W | ∀X ⊆W,N
w
a (X) = N
v
a(X)}. We can check that (W,N,V ) satisfies all the
conditions in Definition 1, which implies (W,N,V ) is a conditional neighborhood model.
B Completeness of CN
In this section we prove Theorem 2. As a first step in the creation of a canonical model, we define
formula closures.
Definition 14. Let α ∈ LCN be any CN-consistent formula, i.e., 0CN ¬α . The basic closure of α ,
denoted as Φ(α), is the smallest set of formula Γ such that:
• if φ is a sub-formula of α ∧⊤, then φ ∈ Γ;
• if φ ∈ Γ and φ is not a negation, then ¬φ ∈ Γ;
• if φ ,ψ ∈ Γ, then φ ∧ψ ∈ Γ.
Let ΦB(α) be the smallest extension of Φ(α) such that
• if φ ,ψ ∈Φ(α), then Ba(φ ,ψ) ∈Φ
B(α) for each a ∈ Ag;
• if φ ∈ΦB(α) and φ is not a negation, then ¬φ ∈ΦB(α);
• if φ ,ψ ∈ΦB(α), then φ ∧ψ ∈ΦB(α).
Now we define the canonical model of α . Note that we use maximal consistent subsets of ΦB(α) in-
stead of maximal consistent sets because we want to make sure our model is in some sense differentiable.
Furthermore, for each maximal consistent subset of ΦB(α), we duplicate it Ω number of times, i.e., each
possible world is a maximal consistent subset w of ΦB(α) indexed by a number i ∈ Ω, namely wi. In
this way, we can define an equivalence relation ∼a with the right properties in our canonical model.
Definition 15. A canonical conditional neighborhood model Mα of α is a tuple (W,∼,N,V ) where:
• W = {w⊆ΦB(α) | w is a maximal consistent subset of ΦB(α)}×Ω.
• for each a ∈ Ag, ∼a is an equivalence relation onW such that ∀wi,v j ∈W :
1. if wi ∼a v j, then ∀φ ,ψ ∈Φ(α),w ⊢CN Ba(φ ,ψ) iff v ⊢CN Ba(φ ,ψ);
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2. if wi ∼a v j and w∩Φ(α) = v∩Φ(α), then wi = v j;
3. if ∀φ ,ψ ∈ Φ(α),w ⊢CN Ba(φ ,ψ) iff v ⊢CN Ba(φ ,ψ), then there is a ul ∈W such that v∩
Φ(α) = u∩Φ(α) and wi ∼a ul.
• Nwa (X) := {{v j ∈ X ∩ [wi]a | v ⊢CN ψ} | φ ∈ Φ(α),wi ⊢CN Ba(‖X‖
wi
a ,ψ)}, where [wi]a = {v j ∈
W |wi ∼a v j} and ‖X‖
wi
a is the characteristic formula for X w.r.t. [wi]a, i.e., ∀wi ∈ [w]a, ‖X‖
wi
a ∈w
iff wi ∈ X .
• wi ∈V (p) iff p ∈w.
Note that canonical conditional neighborhood models have equivalence relations ∼a, unlike condi-
tional neighborhood models. However, this is not a problem, because by Proposition 13, conditional
neighborhood models with and without ∼a relations are essentially the same.
Also note that Φ(α) is finite up to logical equivalence, and because Ag is finite, ΦB(α) is finite up to
logical equivalence as well. It follows that by Condition (2) for ∼a each [wi]a is finite.
Because Condition (1) for ∼a, [wi]a is differentiable w.r.t. Φ(α) in the sense that for each subset
X ⊆ [wi]a, there is a characteristic formula φ ∈Φ(α) such that ∀v j ∈ [wi]a, φ ∈ v j iff v j ∈ X , and we use
‖X‖v ja for such characteristic formula.
Lemma 16. A canonical conditional neighborhood modelMα of α exists, given that α is CN-consistent.
Proof. We only need to prove ∼a exists for each a ∈ Ag. Let a ∈ Ag, let MCS be the set of maximal
consistent subsets of ΦB(α), letW =MCS×Ω and let ≈⊆MCS×MCS be the relation such that for all
w,v ∈MCS, w≈ v iff:
• w∩Φ(α) = v∩Φ(α),
• ∀φ ,ψ ∈Φ(α),w ⊢CN Ba(φ ,ψ) iff v ⊢CN Ba(φ ,ψ).
It is easy to check that ≈ is an equivalence relation, and because MCS is finite, JwK= {v |w≈ v} is also
finite. It follows that JwK×Ω is enumerable. Notice that {JvK×Ω | v ∈MCS} is a partition ofW . For
each JwK×Ω ∈ {JvK×Ω | v ∈MCS}, let w0,w1, . . . be an enumeration of JwK×Ω.
Now we define ∼a. Let ∼a ⊆W ×W be the relation such that for all wi,v j ∈W , wi ∼a v j iff
• ∀φ ,ψ ∈Φ(α),w ⊢CN Ba(φ ,ψ) iff v ⊢CN Ba(φ ,ψ),
• wi and v j are both the n-th element in enumerations of JwK×Ω and JvK×Ω respectively, i.e.,
wi = wn and v j = vn for some n ∈Ω.
To check that such ∼a is a desired equivalence relation, first it is easy to verify that it satisfies Condition
(1) in Definition 15.
Now consider Condition (2) in Definition 15. Suppose wi ∼a v j and w∩Φ(α) = v∩Φ(α). Then
we have JwK = JvK, which implies JwK×Ω = JvK×Ω. Furthermore, since wi and v j are both the n-th
element in enumerations of JwK×Ω and JvK×Ω respectively for some n ∈Ω, we obtain wi = v j.
Lastly consider Condition (2) in Definition 15. Let wi,v j ∈W such that
∀φ ,ψ ∈Φ(α),w ⊢CN Ba(φ ,ψ) iff v ⊢CN Ba(φ ,ψ).
Suppose wi is the n-th element in the enumeration of JwK×Ω. Then there is a ul ∈ JvK×Ω such that ul
is the n-th element in the enumeration of JvK×Ω. By the definition of ≈ we have v∩Φ(α) = u∩Φ(α)
and
∀φ ,ψ ∈Φ(α),v ⊢CN Ba(φ ,ψ) iff u ⊢CN Ba(φ ,ψ),
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the latter of which implies
∀φ ,ψ ∈Φ(α),w ⊢CN Ba(φ ,ψ) iff u ⊢CN Ba(φ ,ψ).
Therefore by the definition of ∼a we have wi ∼a ul and v∩Φ(α) = u∩Φ(α).
Lemma 17. LetMα = (W,∼,N,V ) be a canonical conditional neighborhood model of a CN-consistent
formula α , let a ∈ Ag, w ∈W, and let φ ∈Φ(α) such that v ⊢CN φ for all v ∈ [w]a. Then Kaφ ∈ w.
Proof. Because φ ∈ Φ(α), we know that either Kaφ ∈ w or ¬Kaφ ∈ w. Suppose for contradiction that
¬Kaφ ∈ w. Then w ⊢CN Kˇa¬φ . Let
• v− = {¬φ}∪{Ba(ψ ,χ) ∈w | ψ ,χ ∈Φ(α)}∪{¬Ba(ψ ,χ) ∈ w | ψ ,χ ∈Φ(α)}.
v− should be consistent, for otherwise there are
Ba(α1,β1), . . . ,Ba(αk,βk),¬Ba(γ1,δ1), . . . ,¬Ba(γl,δl) ∈ w
such that
⊢CN
k∧
i=1
Ba(αi,βi)∧
l∧
i=1
¬Ba(γi,δi)→ φ ,
which implies, by (Nec-K) and (Dist-K),
⊢CN
k∧
i=1
KaBa(αi,βi)∧
l∧
i=1
Ka¬Ba(γi,δi)→ Kaφ ,
and then using (5B) and (4B) we have w ⊢CN Kaφ , contrary to w ⊢CN Kˇa¬φ . It follows that v
− is
consistent, and then by Condition (3) in Definition 15, there is a v ∈ [w]a such that ¬φ ∈ v, contrary to
our assumption that for all v ∈ [w]a, v ⊢CN φ .
Therefore w ⊢CN Kaφ , i.e., Kaφ ∈w.
Theorem 18. Every CN-consistent formula α has a conditional neighborhood model Mα .
Proof. Suppose 0¬α . LetMα = (W,∼,N,V ) be a canonical conditional neighborhood model of α , and
for all a ∈ Ag, w ∈W and X ⊆W , let ‖X‖wa be the characteristic formula for X w.r.t. [w]a, i.e., ∀v∈ [w]a,
‖X‖wa ∈ v iff v ∈ X . It suffice to show that (W,∼,N,V ) is a conditional neighborhood model* (see
Definition 12), and then by Proposition 13 we can obtain that (W,N,V ) is a conditional neighborhood
model.
Clearly ∼a are equivalence relations. It follows that for each v ∈ [w]a, [v]a = [w]a, which implies
∀w,v ∈W∀X ⊆W,w ∼a v only if ‖X‖
w
a = ‖X‖
v
a . (1)
It remains to show that N satisfies (c), (a), (d), (sc) and (ec). Let a ∈ Ag, w ∈W and X ⊆W .
First we consider (c), but it is straightforward by the definition of Nwa (X).
Second for (a). Consider all u ∈ [w]a, Y,Z ⊆W . Z ∈ N
w
a (Y ) iff
∃ψ ∈Φ(α),w ⊢CN Ba(‖Y‖
w
a ,ψ) and Z = {v ∈ Y ∩ [w]a | v ⊢CN ψ}
iff by ‖X‖wa ,ψ ∈Φ(α), Definition 15(1) and (1)
∃ψ ∈Φ(α),u ⊢CN Ba(‖Y‖
u
a ,ψ) and Z = {v ∈Y ∩ [u]a | v ⊢CN ψ}
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iff Z ∈ Nua (Y ).
Third for (d), where we use axioms (D), (N) and (M). Consider any Y ∈ Nwa (X). By the definition of
Nwa (X), we have that there is a φ ∈Φ(α) such that Y = {v∈ X ∩ [w]a | v⊢CN φ} and w ⊢CN Ba(‖X‖
w
a ,φ).
Using (D) we can derive that
w ⊢CN ¬Ba(‖X‖
w
a ,¬φ). (2)
Now suppose by contradiction that there is a ψ ∈ Φ such that X −Y = {v ∈ X | v ⊢CN ψ} and w ⊢CN
Ba(‖X‖
w
a ,ψ). Then by (N) we have w ⊢CN Ba(‖X‖
w
a ,‖X‖
w
a ∧ψ). Note that for each v ∈ [w]a, v ⊢CN
‖X‖wa ∧ψ only if v ∈ X −Y only if v ⊢CN ¬φ , i.e., v ⊢CN ‖X‖
w
a ∧ψ → ¬φ . Thus by Lemma 17 and
‖X‖wa ,φ ,ψ ∈ Φ(α) we can get that Ka(‖X‖
w
a ∧ψ → ¬φ) ∈ w, and then using (M) we obtain w ⊢CN
Ba(‖X‖
w
a ,¬φ), contrary to (2).
Then for (sc), we use (T) and (SC). Consider any Y,Z ⊆ X ∩ [w]a such that X ∩ [w]a−Y /∈ N
w
a (X).
Because X ∩ [w]a−Y /∈ N
w
a (X), we have w 0 Ba(‖X‖
w
a ,¬‖Y‖
w
a ). Recall that ‖X‖
w
a ,¬‖Y‖
w
a ∈Φ(α), we
know that either B(‖X‖wa ,¬‖Y‖
w
a ) ∈ w or ¬B(‖X‖
w
a ,¬‖Y‖
w
a ) ∈w. It follows that
w ⊢CN ¬B(‖X‖
w
a ,¬‖Y‖
w
a ). (3)
If X ∩ [w]a−Y = /0, then X ∩ [w]a =Y , which implies there is no such Z with Y ( Z; thus (sc) vacuously
holds. Suppose v ∈ X ∩ [w]a−Y and v ∈ Z ) Y . Then v ⊢CN ‖X‖
w
a ∧¬‖Y‖
w
a ∧‖Z‖
w
a . Using (T) we
can obtain that v ⊢CN Kˇa(‖X‖
w
a ∧¬‖Y‖
w
a ∧ ‖Z‖
w
a ). By v ∈ [w]a and Condition (1) in Definition 15,
w ⊢CN Kˇa(‖X‖
w
a ∧¬‖Y‖
w
a ∧‖Z‖
w
a ). It follows that, using (3) and (SC), w ⊢CN Ba(‖X‖
w
a ,‖Y‖
w
a ∨‖Z‖
w
a ).
Because Y ( Z and thus Z = {v ∈ X ∩ [w]a | v ⊢CN ‖Y‖
w
a ∨‖Z‖
w
a }, we have Z ∈ N
w
a (X).
Last for (ec). Consider any Y ⊆W such that X ∩ [w]a =Y ∩ [w]a. Clearly X ∩ [w]a and Y ∩ [w]a have
the same characteristic formula w.r.t. [w]a, i.e., ‖X‖
w
a = ‖Y‖
w
a . Let Z ⊆W . Z ∈ N
w
a (X) iff
∃ψ ∈Φ(α),w ⊢CN Ba(‖X‖
w
a ,ψ) and Z = {v ∈ X ∩ [w]a | v ⊢CN ψ}
iff since ‖X‖wa = ‖Y‖
w
a and X ∩ [w]a = Y ∩ [w]a,
∃ψ ∈Φ(α),w ⊢CN Ba(‖Y‖
w
a ,ψ) and Z = {v ∈ Y ∩ [w]a | v ⊢CN ψ}
iff Z ∈ Nwa (Y ).
Lemma 19. (Truth Lemma) Let α ∈ LCN be a CN-consistent formula and let Mα = (W,N,V ) be a
canonical conditional neighborhood model of α removing equivalence relation ∼. Then for all formulas
φ ∈Φ(α) and w ∈W, Mα ,w CN φ iff φ ∈ w.
Proof. We prove by induction on φ . The cases of⊤, p and the Boolean combinations are straightforward.
For the case of Ba(ψ ,χ). Let X be any set such that {v∈ [w]a |ψ ∈ v}⊆X . Note that because Ba(ψ ,χ)∈
Φ(α), we have ψ ,χ ∈Φ(α).
Note that for each v ∈ [w]a, ψ ∈ v iff v ∈ X iff ‖X‖
w
a ∈ v. Thus for each v ∈ [w]a, v ⊢CN ψ ↔‖X‖
w
a .
It follows, by Lemma 17
Ka(φ ↔‖X‖
w
a ) ∈ w. (4)
Also note that Mα ,w  Ba(ψ ,χ) iff {v ∈ JψKMα ∩ [w]a |Mα ,v  χ} ∈ N
w
a (JψKMα ) iff (induction
hypothesis) X = JψK
M
and {v ∈ X ∩ [w]a | χ ∈ v} ∈ N
w
a (X). Thus
Mα ,w  Ba(ψ ,χ) iff {v ∈ X ∩ [w]a | χ ∈ v} ∈ N
w
a (X). (5)
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Suppose Ba(ψ ,χ)∈w. Then we have w⊢ Ba(ψ ,χ), which implies by (4) and (ec) w ⊢Ba(‖X‖
w
a ,χ).
It follows that {v ∈ X ∩ [w]a | χ ∈ v} ∈ N
w
a (X), and hence, using (5), Mα ,w  Ba(ψ ,χ).
Suppose Mα ,w  Ba(ψ ,χ), and hence by (5) {v ∈ X ∩ [w]a | χ ∈ v} ∈ N
w
a (X). Then there is a
χ ′ ∈Φ(α) such that {v∈X∩ [w]a | χ
′ ∈ v}= {v∈X∩ [w]a | χ ∈ v} andw⊢Ba(‖X‖
w
a ,χ
′). It follows, by
Lemma 17 that Ka(χ
′↔ χ) ∈w. Using (4), (ec) and (M) we have w ⊢ Ba(ψ ,χ). Recall that Ba(ψ ,χ) ∈
Φ(α), we can obtain Ba(ψ ,χ) ∈w.
C Completeness of PC and PC±
Theorem 20. (Soundness) PC is sound w.r.t. PC.
Proof. To illustrate that [φ ]Ba(ψ ,χ)↔ (φ → Ba(φ ∧ [φ ]ψ ,φ ∧ [φ ]χ)) is sound. Consider any conditional
neighborhood model M= (W,N,V ) and any w ∈W .
M,w  [φ ]Ba(ψ ,χ), iffM,w  φ only ifM
φ ,w  Ba(ψ ,χ), iffM,w  φ only if {v ∈ JψKMφ ∩ [w]
φ
a |
M
φ ,w  χ} ∈Mwa (JψKMφ ).
M,w  φ → Ba(φ ∧ [φ ]ψ ,φ ∧ [φ ]χ) iffM,w  φ only ifM,w  Ba(φ ∧ [φ ]ψ ,φ ∧ [φ ]χ), iffM,w  φ
only if {v ∈ Jφ ∧ [φ ]ψK
M
∩ [w]a |M,v  φ ∧ [φ ]χ} ∈ N
w
a (Jφ ∧ [φ ]ψKM).
Let v ∈W .
1. M,v  φ ∧ [φ ]χ iffM,v  φ and M,v  φ implies Mφ ,v  χ iffMφ ,v  χ .
2. M,v  φ ∧ [φ ]ψ iff M,v  φ and M,v  ψ implies Mφ ,v  ψ iffMφ ,v  ψ .
3. M,w  φ implies v ∈ Jφ ∧ [φ ]ψK
M
∩ [w]a iff M,w  φ implies M,v  φ ∧ [φ ]ψ and w ∼a v iff
M
φ ,v  ψ and w∼
φ
a v iff v ∈ JψKMφ ∩ [w]
φ
a .
It follows thatM,w  φ → Ba(φ ∧ [φ ]ψ ,φ ∧ [φ ]χ) iffM,w  φ implies {v ∈ JψKMφ ∩ [w]
φ
a |Mφ ,v 
χ} ∈Mwa (JψKMφ ), iffM,w  [φ ]Ba(ψ ,χ), and this completes our proof.
Theorem 21. The PC Calculus is complete.
Proof. This follows directly from the completeness of CN, plus the fact that the axioms for public an-
nouncement update are reduction axioms: we can compile out the update operators to reduce PC to
CN.
Theorem 22. (Soundness) PC± is sound w.r.t. PC±.
Proof. To illustrate that [±φ ]Ba(ψ ,χ)↔ (φ →Ba(φ∧ [±φ ]ψ , [±φ ]χ))∧(¬φ →Ba(¬φ∧ [±φ ]ψ , [±φ ]χ))
is sound. Consider any conditional neighborhood model M = (W,N,V ) and any w ∈W . We consider
two cases: M,w  φ or M,w  ¬φ .
First suppose M,w  φ . Then M,w  [±φ ]Ba(ψ ,χ), iff M
±φ ,w  Ba(ψ ,χ), iff {v ∈ JψKM±φ ∩
[w]
±φ
a |M±φ ,w  χ} ∈Mwa (JψKM±φ ).
Furthermore, M,w  (φ → Ba(φ ∧ [±φ ]ψ , [±φ ]χ))∧ (¬φ → Ba(¬φ ∧ [±φ ]ψ , [±φ ]χ)) iff (because
M,w  φ ,)M,w  Ba(φ ∧ [±φ ]ψ , [±φ ]χ) iff
{v ∈ Jφ ∧ [±φ ]ψK
M
∩ [w]a |M,v  φ ∧ [±φ ]χ} ∈ N
w
a (Jφ ∧ [±φ ]ψKM).
Let v ∈W .
1. M,v  φ ∧ [±φ ]χ iffM,v  φ and M,v  φ implies M±φ ,v  χ iff M±φ ,v  χ .
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2. M,v  φ ∧ [±φ ]ψ iffM,v  φ and M,v  ψ implies M±φ ,v  ψ iffM±φ ,v  ψ .
3. M,w  φ implies v ∈ Jφ ∧ [±φ ]ψK
M
∩ [w]a iff M,w  φ implies M,v  φ ∧ [±φ ]ψ and w∼a v iff
M
±φ ,v  ψ and w∼
±φ
a v iff v ∈ JψKM±φ ∩ [w]
±φ
a .
It follows that M,w  (φ → Ba(φ ∧ [±φ ]ψ , [±φ ]χ)) ∧ (¬φ → Ba(¬φ ∧ [±φ ]ψ , [±φ ]χ)) iff {v ∈
JψK
M
±φ ∩ [w]
±φ
a |M±φ ,v  χ} ∈Mwa (JψKM±φ ), iffM,w  [±φ ]Ba(ψ ,χ).
The proof of the case that M,w  ¬φ is similar to that of the first case, and we omit the proof.
Theorem 23. The PC± calculus is complete.
Proof. Again, this follows directly from the completeness of CN, plus the fact that the axioms for public
announcement update are reduction axioms: we can compile out the update operators to reduce PC± to
CN.
